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Certainty and Uncertainty in Criminal Law  
and the ‘Clarity of Norms’ Doctrine
Krisztina Ficsor*
Abstract. The principle of legality includes numerous requirements which guarantee that criminal law and its 
application meet the demands of the rule of law and legal certainty. One of these requirements is maximum 
certainty according to which the rules of criminal law must be defined in a clear and precise way in order to make 
criminal law understandable and predictable for citizens. In the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court this 
requirement is called the ‘clarity of norms’ doctrine. However, the theoretical content of this doctrine is obscure 
and is also ambiguous in the practice of the Constitutional Court. It is also a problematic phenomenon in the 
Hungarian judicial practice that the principle of maximum certainty is treated as a mere linguistic issue. Judges try 
to solve criminal cases in which criminal laws are uncertain by searching for the meaning of words in dictionaries 
and do not tend to take into consideration moral or justificatory reasons behind the relevant criminal law. The 
Author throws light on the above mentioned problematic elements in the Hungarian legal practice and makes 
efforts to suggest a theoretical solution for these problems.
Keywords: principle of legality, legal certainty, clarity of norms in criminal law
1. INTRODUCTION
In April 2017, two men participated in a demonstration against the Hungarian government 
and its newly adopted law. During the demonstration, one of these two men attempted to 
throw some water-based paint on the wall of the residency of the president of Hungary as 
an expression of their opinion that they disagree with the decision of the president who 
signed a statute after the Parliament adopted it. One of them was successful in throwing 
some yellow water-based paint on the wall and caused minimal damage. The two men were 
arrested by the police and then convicted by the court1 according to the following section of 
the Hungarian Criminal Code:
Public Nuisance 339. § (1) Any person who displays an apparently anti-social and 
violent conduct which is able to incite indignation or alarm in other people is guilty of 
a misdemeanor punishable imprisonment for up to two years, if such act does not 
result in a criminal act of greater gravity.
According to the judge, who decided the case, the behaviour of the protesters could 
be qualified as apparently anti-social, violent and was able to incite indignation. After the 
decision was made, it was found out that the judge, who actually convicted the two men, 
defended his PhD dissertation in 2010. One of the main theoretical issues addressed by the 
judge’s dissertation was whether the conduct declared by the above mentioned section in 
the criminal code (public nuisance) could be legitimately criminalized by the state in its 
criminal code. So the theoretical question that he wanted to answer was whether this offence 
can be a legitimate part of the criminal code of a constitutional democracy where the rule of 
law is one of the most respected value in the legal system.
*  Assistant Lecturer, University of Debrecen Faculty of Law, Department of Legal Theory and 
Sociology of Law. E-mail: ficsor.krisztina@law.unideb.hu.
1 See the decision of Central District Court of Buda 10. B. I.650/2017/3.
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The conclusion of the dissertation is that the offence of public nuisance is 
unconstitutional. The author argues for the claim that declaring this behaviour as a criminal 
offence in the criminal code violates the rule of law because the concepts it includes 
especially ‘apparently anti-social’, are too vague and uncertain. Thus, it depends on the 
judges’ discretional power whether the offender will be convicted or acquitted and therefore 
the offence of public nuisance violates the principle of legal certainty – it does not have a 
place in the legal system of a constitutional democracy.2
The final conclusion of the dissertation is that it is an obligation of judges to suspend 
the trial in public nuisance cases and they have to appeal to the Constitutional Court asking 
it to annul the particular statute on the basis of its being unconstitutional.
This criminal offence is one of the most controversial criminal offences in the Criminal 
Code of Hungary despite public nuisance been part of the criminal law since 1955 in 
Hungary and a consistent judicial practice had been established3 concerning the question of 
what kind of behaviours can be categorized as public nuisance. Going deeper into in the 
analysis and interpretation of this criminal offence leads to the realization that behind 
the ‘consistent’ judicial practice there is a great debate over the clear content of the concepts 
included in the statute. One of the most controversial and debated concepts in the statute is 
‘apparently anti-social.’ In order to decide that a conduct is anti-social, moreover, apparently 
anti-social, the judge needs to make inquiries in moral issues that are absolutely beyond the 
text of the statute.
However, it is not the aim of this paper to provide an interpretation of the content of 
public nuisance. Rather, the previously mentioned case is interesting because it reveals that 
it is still a debated and serious issue in modern legal systems of how it is possible to make 
law and judicial decisions clear and understandable for citizens.
In the next sections of this article the issue of legal certainty in criminal law and in the 
practice of the Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) will be discussed. The HCC is 
authorized to annul statutes that do not meet the requirements of the so-called ‘clarity of 
norms’ doctrine. The purpose of this paper is to make clear the content of this requirement 
and give an alternative and distinct explanation of certainty in criminal law to the conception 
which dominates the Hungarian jurisprudence and judicial practice of interpreting criminal 
statutes.
Numerous Hungarian criminal law textbooks contain the set of canons of interpretation 
that can be used by judges to reveal the meaning of and dissolve ambiguities and vagueness 
in the text of criminal statutes. The interpretative strategies of these textbooks, on the one 
hand, can be categorized by answering the question of what kind of argumentative methods 
they use to reveal the meaning of criminal statutes. In accordance with this classification of 
interpretative methods, distinctions can be made between linguistic or textual (grammatical), 
logical, historical and systematic interpretation. The function of linguistic interpretation is 
to unfold the semantic content of legal concepts included in criminal statutes.4 When legal 
argumentation is based on logical interpretation, the interpreter focuses on the rules of 
2 Hornyák (2010) 158–70. 
3 Bócz (2017) 5.
4 In the Hungarian legal literature and judicial practice this interpretative method is usually 
called ‘grammatical’ interpretation. However, I prefer using the phrase of ‘linguistic’ or ‘textual’ 
interpretation because this method is not only about revealing the grammatical structure of words and 
sentences, but its aim is to find the ‘true meaning’ of them. In short, it is a semantical analysis of legal 
sentences and concepts. Blutman (2007) 4.
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formal logic. The fundamental source of historical interpretation is the intention and 
purposes of the legislator behind criminal rules. By applying systematic interpretation, 
judges can come to conclusions concerning the meaning of criminal rules by finding the 
given criminal rule’s place in the context of the legal system as a whole.5
Taking into consideration the possible results of interpretation, extensive, restrictive 
and declarative interpretations can be differentiated. These canons of interpretation reflect 
the tension between the plain or literal meaning of criminal norms’ text and the legislative 
purpose behind them.6 The interpretation of a statute is extensive if the criminal norm is 
applied to cases which cannot be subsumed under the plain meaning or semantic content of 
the norm. Restrictive interpretation refers to the argumentative strategy of narrowing 
‘the set of cases that the statute would have ruled if the judge had interpreted it literally.’7 
The result of declarative interpretation is a judicial decision that does not go beyond the 
‘true meaning’, or the semantic content of the criminal norm’s text.8
Beyond the canons of interpretation mentioned above, the teleological interpretation is 
also an often discussed interpretative strategy among legal scholars. When a judicial 
decision is based on reasons stemming from teleological interpretation of the statute, it 
means that the judge takes into consideration the relevant justificatory purpose or moral 
principle behind the statute.9 Although, it is an important prescription in the Fundamental 
Law of Hungary that legal rules must be interpreted in accordance with their purposes and 
with the Fundamental Law,10 it is still a debated issue in legal theory and in theories of 
adjudication that in what kind of cases it is allowed for judges to go beyond the literal 
meaning of statutes in their reasoning and how they can justify decisions that are in 
contradiction with the plain meaning of the legal rule. The Author believes that it is a 
common feature of adjudication that different canons of interpretation can result in and can 
lead to different legal conclusions in the same case. Furthermore, the application of certain 
canons of interpretation is determined by important constitutional principles e.g., separation 
of powers, the rule of law, the principle of democracy, it will always be a ‘hot issue’ in the 
theoretical discourse as to which one of them can be the right basis of judicial decisions and 
why.
However, this analysis focuses on the theoretical problems raised by the Hungarian 
legal practice and its theoretical implications go beyond a mere illustration of the Hungarian 
problems.
The problems that appear in the Hungarian judicial practice can be placed into a 
broader set of problems which characterizes the nature of legal decision-making and legal 
interpretation in Central and Eastern Europe. Empirical examinations of judicial decisions 
in Central and Eastern Europe demonstrated the fact that, even if the circumstances changed 
in the last few years,11 judges tend to follow a formalist method of decision-making and 
interpretation of rules when they decide cases.
The most important feature of this kind of interpretative method is that judges mostly 
strive for searching for the plain meaning of rules without resorting to the relevant 
  5 Belovics (2017) 122–23.
  6 Canale and Tuzet (2018) 67.
  7 Canale and Tuzet (2018) 68.
  8 Nagy (2014) 122. and Gál (2010) 67.
  9 Nagy (2014) 109.
10 The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article 28.
11 Bencze et al. (2015).
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justificatory reasons of statutes that they have to apply. Interpretation of rules is rather a 
matter of linguistic analysis and they rule out moral reasons or purposes behind the rules 
from the justification of their decisions.12 This kind of judicial strategy of interpreting 
rules can be discerned especially in criminal law. The reason for this is that the theoretical 
conception of criminal law is dominated by the perception that criminal law is the set of 
legal rules that enables the state to confine citizens’ freedom of action with the most 
powerful coercive means. For this reason it is essential to build principles of the rule of law 
in criminal law that guarantee the safety of citizens from the state e.g., maximum certainty 
and textual, linguistic interpretation of rules. It is in the aim of this essay to demonstrate 
that the methods of judicial interpretation which determines the application of criminal law 
in Hungary (and in Central and Eastern Europe) is misleading and sometimes can result in 
irrational or unjust decisions. It will be suggested that that judges need to face uncertainty 
of criminal law by accepting a strategy of reasoning that is more open to the moral basis of 
criminal law and the justificatory reasons or the ratio legis behind criminal rules, without 
ignoring the principles of legality.
2. THE PRINCIPLES OF THE RULE OF LAW CONCERNING CRIMINAL LAW  
IN MODERN LEGAL SYSTEMS
The demand of clarity in criminal law is inevitable because criminal rules, as any other kind 
of legal rules, are necessary to govern human conducts in a predictable manner and are 
needed for legal decision-makers to solve legal problems in a coherent and consistent way.
In modern constitutional democracies, criminal law must be based on a system of rules 
that are able to guide citizens’ conducts effectively and principles guaranteeing that 
authorities creating and applying criminal laws will respect human rights and autonomy of 
the members of the political community. Montesquieu states in The Spirit of Laws that 
‘Political liberty consists in security; or at least, in the opinion that we enjoy security. 
This security is never more dangerously attacked than in public or private accusations. It is 
therefore on the goodness of criminal laws that the liberty of the subject principally 
depends.’13
The paper will make an outline of the most important principles of the rule of law that 
must guide legislation and the interpretation of criminal laws, leaning on the analysis 
established by Andrew Ashworth. Light will then be shone on some differences that exist in 
the system of principles in the Hungarian criminal law.
According to Ashworth, a contrast between two principles dominates the debates 
over the proper justificatory or moral basis of criminal law. There are principles the function 
of which is to impose restraint on authorities creating and applying criminal law. Principles 
of restraint demand that legislators and courts must respect the limits of their power 
when adopting and interpreting criminal laws. These principles embrace the principle of 
non-retroactivity, the principle of maximum certainty and the principle of strict-
construction.14
According to the non-retroactivity principle, courts must apply criminal laws that were 
in effect at the time when the offence was committed. Citizens must be convicted under 
12 Bencze et al. (2010) 87.
13 Montesquieu (1776) 269.
14 Horder (2016) 66.
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laws that previously declared a conduct as a criminal offence and thus conviction by courts 
can only be legitimate if the conduct can be brought under a previously adopted law. This 
principle aims at respecting citizens’ ability and right to plan their life and conducts 
according to law, to expect and foresee what the law requires from them.15
One of the most important requirements of the rule of law in modern states is that the 
state must establish a system of law in which the members of the political community are 
able to understand from the text (the wording) of the statute of what kind of behaviour is 
required by the law. This is the demand of legal certainty or maximum certainty which 
requires that criminal laws must be clearly and precisely defined.16 According to the report 
adopted by the Venice Commission in 2011 ‘legal certainty requires that legal rules are 
clear and precise and aim at ensuring that situations and legal relationships remain 
foreseeable.’17
The principle of strict construction establishes the requirement for courts that if any 
doubt arises concerning the meaning of a criminal statute it must be resolved in the favour 
of the defendant.18
These principles especially maximum certainty and non-retroactivity principle, aim at 
protecting respecting individuals of the community as rational and autonomous persons 
who are able to plan their life by complying with the rules of law and the demand of 
avoiding the possibility of arbitrary decisions of political authorities.19 In sum, principles of 
restraint establish a picture of criminal law where human rights of citizens are fully 
respected by building up a strict, clear and precise system of criminal rules which enables 
citizens to predict and foresee what conducts are required and forbidden by criminal 
statutes.
In contrast to principles of restraint, the authoritarian principle reflects a more flexible 
conception of criminal law in which it is allowed for courts to bring within the scope of 
existing criminal offences conducts that are worthy of criminalization, however they cannot 
be subsumed under the meaning of any of the previously declared offences.20 If adjudication 
is guided by this principle judges have discretional power which is, of course, not 
unconstrained, to decide if a wrongdoing, not covered explicitly by the meaning of any 
existing offences, can be reasonably criminalized by constructing a new offence or 
extending the scope of a previously existing offence. This principle is antithetic to the 
principle of maximum certainty and emphasizes that judges should take into account the 
permanently changing world in which new forms of criminal conducts always emerge. 
The essence of the authoritarian principle is the thin ice principle – citizens who know that 
their behaviour is on the borderline of illegality must expect that they can be convicted for 
committing a crime.21
15 Horder (2016) 82–83. 
16 Horder (2016) 85. 
17 Report on the Rule of Law. (2011) Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 86th plenary 
session. Venice, 25–26 March 11.
18 Horder (2016) 87. 
19 Horder (2016) 86–87.
20 Horder (2016) 89. 
21 Horder (2016) 89. As Horder cites Lord Morris’s ‘definition’ of the thin ice principle: ‘those 
who skate on thin ice can hardly expect to find a sign which will denote the precise spot where he will 
fall in.’
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Hungarian criminal law is built upon similar principles of the rule-of law; however, 
it differs in some ways from the Anglo-Saxon conception of criminal law. The principles of 
legality can be expressed by the principle of nullum crimen sine lege which can be divided 
into four ‘sub-principles.’ The principles of non-retroactivity and maximum certainty are 
essential elements of Hungarian criminal law as well and two more important principles: 
the requirement of written criminal laws and the prohibition of resorting to analogy by 
judges.22
In Hungary, the conditions of criminal liability and legal punishments can only be 
determined in previously adopted written statutes. It is not allowed for judges to create or 
change these factors of criminal offences in practice. In this context, legal certainty means 
that citizens are only able to learn what is forbidden and allowed by law if their rights and 
obligations are declared in precisely formed statutes.
In principle, as a fourth requirement of legality, it is not allowed for judges to extend 
the scope of existing criminal offences to new circumstances by interpretation. This is the 
prohibition of analogy. Judges are bound by the precise meaning of criminal norms’ text. 
This also entails that judges should apply the textual interpretation of criminal statutes, they 
should reveal the semantic content of the concepts included in rules, and they are not 
allowed to rely on other kinds of interpretative method, for example on the teleological 
interpretation the point of which is that the clear content of statutes should be explored by 
revealing and interpreting the justificatory principles, moral values and aims behind the 
statutes. In criminal cases it is forbidden for judges to resort to moral values, because moral 
values are highly disputed among the members of the political community and make 
criminal adjudication unpredictable.23
Thus, the authoritarian principle is not accepted in the Hungarian criminal 
jurisprudence. However, the authoritarian principle reflects the problems that can occur in 
every-day judicial decision-making – it can often happen that the wording of the statute 
does not provide a certain answer for the case. In such cases, judges have to engage in 
moral reasoning which includes the relevant moral values and arguments that lurk behind 
the applicable criminal norm. However, in the Hungarian judicial practice, it is a detectable 
attitude of judges that they do not tend to face the moral dilemmas that are generated by the 
facts of a certain case. The main reason for this is that legal certainty, the protection of 
individual freedom and the separation of powers do not allow judges to create new offences 
or extend the scope of offences arbitrarily. The justification of the decisions is established 
mostly by searching for the plain meaning of words in dictionaries or by looking for the 
ordinary meaning by a linguistic and grammatical analysis, which can be a wrong strategy 
of interpreting criminal norms in certain cases.24
22 Nagy (1995) 257–70.
23 It must be emphasized that the principle of retroactivity, the prohibition of applying non-
written rules and resorting to analogy in criminal law pertain only to cases when they would be used 
to the detriment of the defendant. Applying a criminal norm retroactively or using analogy in a given 
case does not necessarily violate human rights if they are applied in favour of the defendant. It also 
must be made clear that Article 28 of the Fundamental Law of Hungary prescribes for judges to 
interpret the wording of legal rules in light of their justificatory purposes and in accordance with the 
Fundamental Law of Hungary. However, judges are not allowed to base their decision on moral and 
political values if the result of the decision would be holding someone guilty for an act which does 
not constitute a criminal offence under Hungarian or EU or international law. (Article XXVIII. section 
4 of the Fundamental Law)
24 However, there is an exception of this principle – the extension of criminal offences can be 
realized only in the favour of the defendant. Nagy (1995) 261–66.
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In Montesquieu’s interpretation the liberty of individuals depends on the goodness of 
criminal statutes. To summarize the implications of the above mentioned principles, the 
goodness of criminal laws lies in
a) their ability to guide citizens’ conducts effectively, determines precisely what is 
required and what is forbidden and enables them to understand and follow the rules without 
doubts concerning their meaning;
b) respecting the human rights of citizens – respecting the ability of individuals of 
being rational and autonomous human beings who have freedom of action and freedom 
of deciding what kind of values they accept and pursue as guiding principles of good life. 
In constitutional democracies, political authorities creating and interpreting criminal rules 
respect the limits of their power and human rights are the most important constraints on the 
criminal power of the state.
2. THE PRINCIPLE OF MAXIMUM CERTAINTY IN THE PRACTICE  
OF THE HUNGARIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
After a brief illustration of the principles of legality in the Anglo-Saxon and the Hungarian 
jurisprudence, it is time to focus on the question of how these principles are interpreted in 
the judgments of the Hungarian Constitutional Court. These requirements of legality are 
represented by the ‘clarity of norms’ doctrine in the practice of the HCC which annuls 
statutes that do not meet the requirements set forth by the doctrine. The HCC is authorized 
to annul vague, uncertain and ambiguous statutes stating that they are in contradiction with 
the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
The most important theoretical issue here is that how the principle of maximum 
certainty and the principle concerning the judicial interpretation of criminal norms can be 
realized in practice. How can be clearness and certainty theoretically grasped? Taking into 
consideration that the language of law always carries uncertainty and indeterminacy to 
some degree, some theoretical questions cry out for clear answers. What does it mean that a 
norm is clear? Is it possible to draw a sharp line between uncertain but still constitutional 
norms and unconstitutional norms because of being unclear? What are the criteria according 
to which it is possible to determine whether a criminal statute is unconstitutional because of 
being vague? What is the role of judicial interpretation of rules in this context? Judicial 
interpretations of criminal norms are inevitable in almost every case so to what extent are 
judges authorized to make the statutes’ content ‘clear’?
2.1. The addressees of criminal norms
The principle of maximum certainty (clarity of norms) expects criminal norms to be clear 
and understandable means the question that should be answered is ‘Who are the addressees 
of criminal norms?’25 Who are the persons who should understand criminal norms properly? 
Regarding to this question, certainty or clarity of criminal norms can be interpreted in two 
dimensions depending on the addressees of norms.
One of the most important group of persons to whom criminal norms are addressed are 
the citizens. If ‘clearness’ or ‘certainty’ are to mean from the perspective of the citizen, it is 
necessary to analyze the special features and circumstances of citizens who have to obey 
criminal norms.
25 Gellér (2012) 65–94.
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Judges represent the other type of addressees because they are the ones who decide 
cases according to criminal norms. Judges make clear the content of criminal norms and 
concepts through interpretation. The crucial issue here is that criminal rules must be drafted 
in a way which enables judges to unfold a reasonable interpretation of the norm and to 
avoid the making of arbitrary decisions.
2.2. How is ‘clarity’ defined in the Hungarian Constitutional Court’s decisions?
The Hungarian Constitutional Court (HCC) approaches the concept of clarity rather in a 
negative way – it defines what kind of drafting of the norm can be considered as unclear. 
The first ‘version’ of an unclear criminal norm, in the HCC’s interpretation, is when the 
scope of it is too broad, that is, the norm is drafted in an extremely abstract, general way. 
In judicial practice the result of such formulation of a rule can be arbitrary judicial 
interpretation as it gives opportunity for judges to decide cases in light of their subjective 
considerations, creates incoherent and unstable judicial practice where contradictory 
interpretations can be given to the same rule.26
The second type of unclear norms,  which is mentioned in some decisions of the HCC, 
can be when the scope of the norm is too narrow, the norm is extremely exhaustive, specifies 
every possible occurrence of the particular conduct. The problem which can be entailed by 
such drafting of norms is that it unduly constrains judges in deciding cases. A criminal 
norm with too narrow scope has the potential to ‘force’ judges to acquit offenders who 
actually should be convicted if the justificatory principles behind the norm is taken into 
consideration. However, the conduct at issue is not literally included in the text of the norm. 
It can occur that the offender committed a wrongful act for which, taking into consideration 
all circumstances of the case and the purpose and justifying principles of criminal law in 
general, the offender should be convicted, however, the wording of the relevant section of 
the criminal code does not include literally that certain kind of conduct. Since the extension 
of the scope of criminal norms is not allowed for judges by interpretation as in such cases 
they would have no any option except for acquitting the offender.27
In some cases, the HCC dismisses claims criticizing the criminal norm for being too 
abstract and hence unconstitutional on the ground that the criminal law and statutes should 
be formulated in a flexible, abstract and general way. The HCC often asserts in its reasoning 
that there are offences that can be committed in uncountable ways. If, in such cases, the 
legislator defined the offence in an exhaustive and detailed way, if it made efforts to build 
in the definition all possible ways in which the offence could be committed, this legislative 
strategy in itself would infringe the rule of law exactly because of the previously mentioned 
problem – judges would not have the possibility to convict offenders whose conduct are in 
contradiction with criminal law and its purposes but their conduct is not involved explicitly 
in the text of the criminal statute.28 In cases where it is not possible to enumerate all 
probable ways of perpetration of a certain offence, judges should be authorized to have 
discretional power to decide what kind of conducts should fall into the category included in 
26 See e.g. the following decisions of the Hungarian Constitutional Court: 38/2012. (XI. 14.) 
HCC; 31/2015. (XI. 18.) HCC; 4/2013. (II. 21.) HCC; 18/2000. (VI. 6.) HCC; 3284/2017. (XI. 14.) 
HCC.
27 However, it is hard to find a decision of the HCC in which the Court annulled a statute 
because of being vague in this sense. 
28 See the following decision of the Constitutional Court: 673/B/2004 HCC.
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the criminal rule. In these cases judges have the right to illuminate the clear content of 
abstract and general concepts of criminal norms by interpretation. Thus, the meaning 
of such norms can be understood by following the judicial practice.29
In other cases, the Court annuls the statute by stating that it is too vague or abstract 
and provides judges with extremely broad discretionary power – therefore the application 
of the norm can be discriminatory.30
The problem that appears in the HCC’s practice is that it is not possible to find a 
coherent theoretical basis of the Court’s distinction between the above mentioned situations. 
On what theoretical grounds it is possible to distinguish between cases when criminal 
norms should meet the requirement of flexibility and adaptability (therefore judges can be 
authorized to make criminal norms’ content clear by interpretation) and cases when criminal 
norms must be precisely and clearly drafted (where judges must apply the norm’s explicit 
semantic content and it is not allowed for them to be creative in interpretation). In brief, it is 
difficult to find a coherent theoretical conception of certainty in the HCC’s practice.
2.3. Emphasizing the judge’s point of view
It seems that regarding to the ‘clarity of norms’ doctrine in the HCC’s practice, in most of 
the cases that the Court sets aside from the citizens’ point of view and when it analyzes the 
clearness or vagueness of a norm it takes the judges’ perspective as a background of its 
reasoning.31 It can be argued for the claim as well that the judges’ point of view is more 
fundamental when clarity of the requirements of certainty is needed.
Why should the judges’ perspective be taken as the starting point when trying to 
understand the theoretical basis of the clarity of norms doctrine? First, judges are entitled to 
determine in their final decision the correct legal meaning of a certain statute. Citizens must 
comply with the content of the final judicial decision even if they accept a different 
interpretation of the statute.
It is impossible to determine objective criteria of ‘clarity’ of norms according to which 
the legislator would be able to draft or enact statutes that are understandable for every 
29 The Court based its decision 673/B/2004. HCC on the same reasons, when it stated that the 
section in the Criminal Code called ‘failure to comply with the reporting obligation related to money 
laundering’ was not unconstitutional. The HCC’s opinion was similar on the constitutionality 
of section called ‘insult of subordinate’ in its decision 769/B/2006. In these cases the court stands 
for the claim that the offences – the constitutionality of which was disputed by the applicants – can be 
committed in numerous ways which cannot be enumerated in the definition of the crimes. The 
legislator did not infringe the Constitution and the rule of law when it defined these conducts by using 
abstract and general concepts leaving a relatively wide scope of discretion for judges to decide 
whether the facts of the disputed case could be subsumed under the rule or not. 
30 In its decision 38/2012. (XI. 14.) HCC the HCC annuled a statute which criminalized the 
conduct of ‘living in public places.’ The Hungarian Government adopted a law in 2012 which contains 
the offence of infringing the rules of residing on public premises for habitation, that is, the Government 
criminalized homelessness in itself. From the reasoning of the decision of the HCC it comes to light 
that almost all of the concepts that are included in the statute are vague and hard to interpret: the norm 
does not make it possible to decide clearly what kind of behaviour can be considered as illegal, or 
when it is possible for the judge to decide that circumstances of an excuse or a justification exist in 
the concrete case. According to the opinion of the Court, the text of the norm is so vague and 
ambiguous that it is not possible to establish its clear content by judicial interpretation. 
31 See the decision of the Constitutional Court 3258/2015. (XII. 22.) HCC.
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single member of the society. In legal theory one criterion is mentioned that a rule is clear 
and unambiguous if ordinary persons with common intelligence are able to understand it.32 
However, the members of the society have not the same intelligence and wisdom to 
understand the texts of criminal norms and most of the offenders, before they commit a 
crime, do not tend to read any of the offences included in criminal codes. Moreover, it can 
occur that even persons with high intelligence are not able to interpret and understand legal 
statutes or see through criminal law’s doctrinal and conceptual system in a proper way.33 
Most of the citizens are not willing to read and interpret legal statutes and when they are 
involved in a criminal procedure, the most important question in which they are interested 
in is the one how the judge will decide their case. Regarding to this question, they rather 
count on the opinions and advices of professional agents like lawyers.
Maybe it would be possible to reduce the interpretative difficulties of unclear laws and 
judicial decisions by using more simple sentences and concepts, for example, ordinary 
words in legal statutes. However even if it is possible, in the linguistic sense, to establish a 
more simple system of communicating legal statements, the problem of uncertainty cannot 
be eliminated totally because of the nature of language. Herbert Hart’s arguments can be 
mentioned here.
In all fields of experience, not only that of rules, there is a limit, inherent in the nature 
of language, to the guidance which general language can provide. […] At this point, 
the authoritative general language in which a rule is expressed may guide only in an 
uncertain way much as an authoritative example does.34
The other reason behind uncertainty in law is the argumentative character of law. Legal 
propositions are normative statements so every single legal statement and interpretation 
can be challenged and disputed. Since jurisprudence does not share the features of 
natural sciences, it cannot be said that in every single case law provides one right answer. 
32 Gellér (2012) 80.
33 An interesting reasoning that was provided by the offender can be found in one of the 
decisions of the Curia (the Supreme Court of Hungary). The offenders were charged with committing 
the offence of vandalism of historic monuments or protected cultural goods (Hungarian Criminal 
Code, s.357). The offenders were owners of a castle which fell under the category of ‘protected 
cultural good.’ According to the facts of the case, the offenders did not comply with the administrative 
laws that prescribed the obligation for the owners of cultural goods to maintain and reserve the castle 
in its original status. They had not implemented any maintaining or reserving work on the castle, so it 
suffered damages. One of the offenders, a law student at the time of the trial, argued that they did not 
commit a crime. In accordance to their textbook, they interpreted the wording of the statute as it only 
could be committed by intentional and active conduct. The scope of the meaning of vandalism, 
according to them and the criminal law textbook, cannot cover conducts that are qualified as 
omissions. Their conduct was an omission of their obligations declared in administrative laws, in the 
result of which they must be acquitted by the judge and should be fined according to administrative 
prescriptions. The Curia, however, convicted them, and based its decision mostly on doctrinal and 
conceptual arguments which are part of the system of criminal law as a whole. Doctrinal arguments 
hardly can be predicted and understood by even a person with high intelligence who spends some 
time to read and interpret legal rules. This does not entail that the court made a right decision in this 
case. (Decision of the Curia Bfv.II.13/2009/5.) See the dissenting opinion of Pokol Béla in the 
decision of the Constitutional Court 3077/2012. (VII. 26.) HCC.
34 Hart (1994) 127.
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It can occur that the same legal statute can be given different but equally reasonable 
interpretations. Moreover, it can happen as well that the interpretation of a statute that is 
given by the citizen differs from the correct legal meaning. Thus, ‘interpretation is probably 
unavoidable and will certainly form part of the judicial function in criminal law. The 
choices which courts make when interpreting statutes are political choices, in the sense 
that they have implications for individual citizens and the community and in the sense that 
judges are effectively making law when they determine the interpretation.’35 Therefore the 
essential theoretical question is how the problem of certainty is treated in judicial practice.
3. CERTAINTY IN JUDICIAL PRACTICE
Certainty in judicial practice is treated as a linguistic problem, in the result of which the 
textual interpretation of criminal norms dominates judicial reasoning. In the reasoning 
of their decisions judges often prefer dictionaries, referring to ordinary and plain meaning 
of the concepts included in criminal statutes. It seems, that in criminal cases judges tend to 
refuse to apply interpretative methods like teleological interpretation which aims to make 
clear legal rules’ meaning by finding and understanding the justificatory reasons and 
purposes behind them.36 Criminal courts often spend time mainly with analyzing the 
semantic content of the concepts included in criminal statutes. The justification for this 
strategy in judicial reasoning is the above mentioned principles of legality and these can 
only be realized by searching for the plain meaning of concepts in criminal norms.
In Hungarian legal theory, László Blutman represents the view that judicial reasoning 
should be based on textual interpretation of statutes. According to him, law and legal 
practice is not only the business of lawyers, judges and prosecutors. Law provides 
authoritative reasons for action, that is, it is an obligation for citizens to act according to the 
prescriptions of law. This is the reason why it is essential for it to be understandable for the 
members of the community. Professor Blutman stands for the claim that, notwithstanding, 
textual interpretation is not an ideal method of justifying legal decisions, judges must base 
their legal conclusions on ordinary or literal meaning of words. This requirement is rooted 
in the principle of the separation of powers, the principle of legal certainty and the demand 
of establishing a coherent and consistent judicial practice. Textual interpretation provides a 
relatively objective ground for justifying and making legal decisions understandable, 
because judges must interpret the wording of statutes in a way as ordinary citizens with 
common sense would understand it. Applying textual interpretation can contribute to a 
coherent and consistent and more predictable judicial practice, while it reduces judicial 
discretion to a minimal level because it excludes the possibility of balancing moral and 
other non-legal arguments from judicial reasoning. So, it contributes to the realization of 
legal certainty and the separation of powers.37
However, certainty in law in judicial reasoning and decision-making cannot be only a 
matter of linguistic theory or a matter of searching for the plain or ordinary meaning of 
words. In the next sections of this paper, the problems of textual interpretation will be 
highlight by describing the reasoning of some judicial decisions. It will be argued that 
whether law is certain or uncertain is not a mere linguistic question. The Author agrees with 
35 Ashworth (1991) 446. 
36 Bencze (2011) 169–71.
37 Blutman (2010) 99–101.
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the often cited Dworkinian thesis that ‘legal practice, unlike many other social phenomena, 
is argumentative. Every actor in the practice understands that what it permits or requires 
depends on the truth of certain propositions that are given sense only by and within the 
practice; the practice consists in large part in deploying and arguing about these 
propositions.’38
In legal practice, it is a familiar phenomenon, as well that lawyers often disagree in the 
question of what law requires or permits. However, this disagreement does not reflect 
different opinions only about the meaning of words. Arguing about the ordinary meaning of 
statutes does not enable lawyers to dissolve disagreements in legal questions completely. 
Disagreement among lawyers about the right legal answers is more complex than debating 
over the literal or ordinary meaning of concepts. Dworkin states that when judges 
(or lawyers in general) disagree about the right legal answer in the same case, it reflects a 
theoretical disagreement about the issue of the relevant sources of law. When two judges 
disagree in the right legal answer for a certain problem, it is often the case that both of them 
have different theories or conceptions about the right sources or grounds of law. They have 
different theories about the issue what law is and what it should be.39
In most of the cases, linguistic arguments provide little help for finding the correct 
legal answer. It can often happen that revealing the plain meaning of the wording of a 
statute is troublesome. This happened in the graffiti-case where both the judge and the 
prosecutor resorted to linguistic arguments and came forward with a distinct interpretation 
of the statute’s plain meaning. This case is a good example for illuminating how linguistic 
arguments and using dictionaries can be misleading in establishing the correct legal 
decision.40 ‘[T]he dictionary is best suited to demonstrating the range of possible meanings 
of a word, rather than indicating a “correct” meaning in a given context.’41 It can also 
38 Dworkin (1986) 5.
39 Dworkin (1986) 3–6.
40 An interesting example of this kind of judicial reasoning is when the arguments were based 
solely on the analysis of the semantic content of legal definitions in the statute. The prosecutor and the 
judge as well resorted to a linguistic analysis by using dictionaries, explicating the words’ ordinary 
and literal meaning and they had come to different conclusions. According to the prosecutor the 
offender was guilty in committing the offence of vandalism by means of placement of graffiti. 
The question was whether this offence can be committed by placing a lettering (a word) on a sheet 
with the intention of expressing the offender’s opinion during a demonstration. In accordance with the 
judge’s opinion, this behaviour cannot be qualified as vandalism because this concrete perpetration 
does not fall under the ordinary and literal meaning of graffiti as graffiti, according to its ordinary and 
literal meaning, only can be placed on walls. The prosecutor referred to the section in the Criminal 
Code which defines the concept of graffiti in the following way: […] ‘graffiti’ means surface coating 
containing images or lettering applied with spray paint, marker pens or any other manner on property 
that is not required for the proper use of the property.’ The prosecutor concluded that the semantic 
content of this section can be determined evidently. Since it includes the word property, and contains 
no reference to wall, it entails that graffiti can be placed on every kinds of property, not only on walls. 
In consequence, the offender, who placed a lettering on a sheet of private ownership with a spray 
paint, committed the crime of vandalism by means of placement of graffiti. Neither the judge’s, 
nor the prosecutor’s reasoning included arguments concerning the right to free speech which is 
obviously a relevant extra-textual principle to take into consideration in this case. See the decision 
EBD 2016. B.5.
41 Ashworth (1991) 428.
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happen that the literal or ordinary meaning of the text is clear even for the citizen, however, 
the decision which is based on the meaning of the text of the statute, would be unjust or 
irrational. These examples from judicial practice can convince that legal certainty and 
determinacy is not only a matter of linguistic considerations about the meaning of statutes. 
Revealing the linguistic content of criminal norms is important but it only scratches the 
surface of legal problems. ‘Interpretation should not, however, be presented solely as a 
dictionary matter: it should be recognized as involving the attribution of meaning to words 
in their statutory context and in the context of relevant legal doctrine.’42
It seems, it is inevitable in criminal cases as well that judges must build ‘extra-textual’ 
arguments in their reasoning, of course, not without restraint. The sources of these extra-
textual’ arguments must originate not in judges’ intuitions and feelings,43 rather in the 
justificatory principles behind criminal norms i.e., the purpose of rule, the relevant legal 
doctrines, fundamental principles of criminal law in general and in the basic constitutional 
principles and human rights of the citizens. These values reflect the political morality of a 
community.
Certainty and clarity are the requirements that judges should make their choices of 
interpretation explicit in every single decision and they should recognize that it is a part of 
adjudication to consider and to weigh constitutional principles and values of criminal law, 
not only the semantic content of words in the statutes.
This demand is represented by the principle of explanatory clarity.44 The requirement 
of explanatory clarity embodies the demand that it is important in every justification of 
decisions to reveal or to explore for the defendant clearly that their point of view about the 
meaning of the statute was taken into consideration by the judge as well. However, it is the 
obligation of the judge to convince the defendant of why their interpretation of the norm 
cannot be accepted as a basis for the correct legal solution of the case. Judges must throw 
light on all of the choices which they made and function as building blocks of their final 
decision. Certainty can be achieved by making every step of their reasoning explicit so that 
the defendant can follow the arguments on which the decision was based. ‘[Criminal law] 
must be capable of being explained by judges to laypersons […] so that they can grasp 
its application to the facts.’45 A very good illustration of a judicial decision which meets the 
demands of explanatory clarity is made by the Debrecen Regional Court of Appeal. In its 
reasoning the court aimed at illuminating every important choice on which it established 
42 Ashworth (1991) 446.
43 Nor can be a correct solution for the problems generated by uncertainty of law that the judge 
resorts to reasons originated in public morality. András Jakab, in one of his essays, argues for the 
claim that judges must follow the opinion of the society in moral issues. In order to recognize public 
morality, the judge only needs to read newspapers and have conversations with ordinary people. Jakab 
(2010) 87. This is obviously a wrong way of deciding cases in general, not only in criminal cases. 
Public morality cannot be the basis of judicial decisions. On the one hand, it is controversial what is 
meant by public morality and even if it was clear, public morality is a changing phenomenon. 
In constitutional democracies the judges’ duty is to apply law to the cases at hand. If it was their 
obligation to follow the opinion of the society it would not be necessary to establish a legal system 
and legal institutions to apply legal statutes. A narrower concept of morality is needed when we refer 
to moral dilemmas that are raised by uncertainty in law. 
44 This concept is borrowed from Jeremy Horder. Horder (2002) 236.
45 Horder (2002) 236.
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its decision.46 The justification of the decision in this case demonstrates how legal certainty 
can and should function in law. Moreover, the reasoning in this decision can serve as a 
starting point when trying to demystify the requirement of the clarity of norms doctrine.
The clarity of norms doctrine establishes the demand that the legislator must enact 
legal norms with a clear and precise text in order to prevent judges from making arbitrary 
decisions or providing inadequate interpretations. How can the HCC decide whether this 
demand is fulfilled by a criminal statute? In one of its decisions, the HCC comes forward 
with a theoretically more grounded reasoning. The Court declared a statute unconstitutional 
which criminalized the conduct of disobedience to the measure of a public officer. 
The Court’s opinion was reported by Miklós Lévay.47 In the reasoning of the decision he 
emphasized, that as the problem evolving around the question of the unconstitutionality of a 
legal rule for being unclear, it is important to take into consideration the justificatory reasons 
behind the rule and the values that are protected by it. After such a justificatory purpose is 
revealed behind the norm, the Court has the possibility to decide whether the legislator 
drafted its text in an extremely broad manner compared to the purpose and values protected 
by the statute. In this concrete issue, the HCC determined the purpose and values behind 
the rule. In general, it was the value of protecting public safety and public order; in 
particular, the public interest in the execution of public measures safely and constantly 
without being obstructed. Taking into consideration these values, the Court decided that, 
compared to the purposes and values behind the statute, the concept of disobedience is too 
vague and abstract which gives judges wide discretionary power, in the result of which they 
will have the opportunity to convict persons whose conduct can be qualified as disobedience. 
However, it does not intend to obstruct or interfere the officer’s measure. Regarding to this 
offence, the Court called on the Parliament to enact a statute with a more sophisticated and 
precise language to prevent judges from making arbitrary and irrational decisions.48
4. A POSSIBLE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND FOR DECIDING PROBLEMS 
GENERATED BY UNCERTAINTY IN CRIMINAL LAW
What kind of theoretical basis can be suggested for approaching the problem of certainty? 
A possible answer can be a conception of the nature of criminal law.
46 Decision of the Debrecen Court of Appeal Pf.I.20.574/2011/5. The question, which had to be 
solved by the court in a civil trial was that whether the offender, after being acquitted by the criminal 
court, is entitled to compensation for being placed in a psychiatric institution. The defendant of the 
preceding criminal trial had given an interpretation of the relevant section in the Code of Criminal 
Proceedings. He applied textual interpretation and based his arguments on the plain meaning of the 
statute. The court agreed that the textual interpretation of the statute given by the defendant was 
correct, however, the plain meaning of the text could not be the basis of the right legal decision. 
The court decided that the offender had no right for compensation and it justified its decision by 
explicating step by step how it had come to its conclusion. The court took into consideration the 
interpretation given by the offender, it explored why this interpretation had been rejected and why it 
was necessary for the court to resort to extra-textual reasons, namely the aims and justificatory 
principles behind the relevant section of the statute. Moreover, the court had provided with a detailed 
explanation about how judicial interpretation of statutes function and explicated the relevant 
interpretative canons that could provide arguments for justifying judicial decisions. 
47 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 31/2015. (XI. 18.) HCC.
48 Decision of the Hungarian Constitutional Court 31/2015. (XI. 18.) HCC.
Brought to you by University of Debrecen | Unauthenticated | Downloaded 04/25/20 08:21 PM UTC
285CERTAINTY AND UNCERTAINTY IN CRIMINAL LAW...
R. A. Duff illuminates a theoretical distinction between two conceptions of criminal 
law. Both of them embrace values that have implications on the question of how the 
problem of certainty in criminal law should be approached.
Briefly, the positivistic conception accepts the following views on the function and 
nature of criminal law. At first, criminal law provides with content-independent reasons for 
actions for citizens. In most of the cases, rules of criminal law are formed as prohibitions to 
which citizens must obey without taking into consideration the content of its prescriptions. 
This means that citizens must obey criminal law and refrain from crime only because the 
law requires it and criminal rules do not presuppose and do not need the substantive 
agreement of citizens. In consequence, criminal norms must be articulated in a clear, certain 
and precise way so that citizens will be able to understand what the law requires from them.
In the positivistic conception of criminal law, the question of why certain conducts are 
wrong cannot be raised. In legal reasoning it is not accepted to argue about the values that 
are protected by criminal offences, it is not allowed to interpret criminal statutes in the light 
of their justifying background reasons and principles.49 Of course, the fundamental reason 
for thinking about criminal law and adjudication in this way is legal positivism’s 
commitment to the sources thesis and the service conception of law – the essence of which 
is that the validity of law should not depend on its moral value.50
In the positivist theory of criminal law, legal certainty and clearness of rules are 
extremely important values, where the legislator is given a huge role in making criminal 
law determinant and understandable for citizens by enacting statutes in a precise and clear 
form. No doubt, the positivistic conception fits very well to the Hungarian perception about 
the theoretical basis of criminal law.
The other conception could be called the ‘Dworkinian theory of criminal law.’ 
However, there is a view that Ronald Dworkin supported a rather positivistic theory of 
criminal law,51 The Author would agree with the statement that the following considerations 
on criminal law’s character could be the reflections of some elements in Dworkin’s theory 
of law, which represents a clear anti-positivist thinking about law in general.
The ‘Dworkinian theory’52 assumes that in every political community there are wrong 
conducts in which the wrongfulness is independent from being prohibited by criminal law. 
In the Anglo-Saxon criminal law these offences are called mala in se53 – conducts that are 
wrong in themselves or wrong by nature e.g., murder, rape, theft etc., in contrast with mala 
prohibita offences the wrongfulness of which is based on the mere fact that law prohibits 
them e.g., driving offences. The essence of mala in se offences is that they violate the 
fundamental moral and political principles of a political community.54 Without analyzing 
the theoretical explanation of distinguishing these two kinds of offences in English criminal 
law, for these purposes here, outlining the rationale behind mala in se offences is enough to 
show that the ‘Dworkinian theory’ can be an adequate theory for criminal law in general.
49 Duff (2002) 51–53.
50 Horder (2002) 222. and Raz (1979) 47.
51 Horder (2002) 222.
52 The implications of Dworkin’s theory on criminal law theory needs a much more detailed 
analysis, however the author will make attempts to explicate it in another essay.
53 In this paper I will not examine in details the distinction between the so called mala in se 
and mala prohibita offences. However, analyzing the nature of these conducts in English criminal law 
has a long tradition which does not have its roots in the Hungarian system of criminal law and 
jurisprudence.
54 Duff (2002) 53.
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In accordance with this theory, criminal law addresses citizens in terms of the values 
which justify the content of criminal law as a whole. This conception of criminal law builds 
its considerations on the picture of a democratic political community in which the common 
life of the citizens is based on shared moral and political values determining the main 
principles of relationships between the citizens and between the state and citizens. Principles 
which delineate the criminal law’s content e.g., what kind of conducts can be legitimately 
criminalized and why, what is the theoretical basis of criminal liability etc., constitute a 
huge part in the system of these moral and political values.
In this view, the reason for obedience to criminal law is not the mere fact that some 
conducts are prohibited by the law. It must always be an issue why certain conducts are 
wrong and declared as criminal offences in the criminal code: that is what the legislator 
must clarify when drafting and enacting criminal statutes. How is this possible? Duff 
suggests that it can be realized by using thick concepts by the legislator when it drafts a 
criminal statute. The legislator should enact statutes in terms of substantive and specific 
ethical values or rather the legal versions of them. These concepts can be easily recognized 
as wrongs by the citizens because they reflect the fundamental substantive values of their 
community.55 The application of these concepts, by the citizens and judges, ‘depends on a 
grasp of the substantive values they embody’.56 According to the ‘Dworkinian theory’, 
criminal law should use a shared normative language through which it communicates the 
fundamental values of the political community.
At the end of this paper, it becomes clear that this article has argued for a more flexible 
criminal law and a more flexible judicial reasoning in criminal cases. It is far from the 
purpose to eliminate the requirement of clarity and the demands of maximum certainty 
from criminal law. Rather a different conception of clarity and certainty has been suggested 
which could be realized by mainly judges. Legal certainty is one of the most important 
principles of criminal law. However, it seems that in judicial practice this principle is 
conceived of as it justifies textual interpretation (even if revealing the ordinary meaning 
results in an irrational or unjust decision).57 Legal certainty is a more complex set of 
requirements than analyzing and determining the semantic content of rules – it is not just a 
matter of linguistic theory. Criminal law reflects very important moral and political values 
and principles should appear in judicial reasoning as arguments justifying the correct legal 
decision in cases when criminal rules are uncertain.
5. CONCLUSIONS
Despite the fact that the section of public nuisance is articulated in an extremely abstract 
and general way in the criminal code, its constitutionality should not be questioned. 
The Author’s opinion is that many conducts can fall under the scope of this section 
evidently. There are conducts of public nuisance the wrongfulness of which are self-evident 
55 Duff (2002) 56–61.
56 Duff (2002) 61.
57 E.g., the description of the prosecutors’ reasoning in the following article: Deák (2014). 
In one of the decisions of the Szeged Regional Court of Appeal (Bf.III.429/2013/5.) the Court resorted 
to the teleological interpretation of the relevant section of the criminal code, it based its decision on 
the purpose and values protected by the rule. The prosecutor supported textual interpretation – by 
referring to the principle of legal certainty – and he insisted on the plain meaning of the text even if 
the decision inferred from the semantic content would have been irrational and unjust. 
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and the members of the community have the right to be protected from them. It is, of 
course, not an easy task to decide whether the offenders must be convicted. However, 
analyzing the linguistic content of the section will not provide with any help.
According to the presented point of view, the case mentioned at the beginning of the 
paper, is not a public nuisance offence. However, it should be compared to another decision 
which, in contrast to the court’s standpoint, is evidently a case of public nuisance.
In the following case, the Court decided that the offender’s conduct could be qualified 
as violation of the freedom of conscience and religion58 (Criminal Code, section 215). 
In the description of the facts, it turned out that numerous persons participated in a 
procession, a religious marching in the street. While the offender was approaching them by 
car, he became outraged because of the road had been blocked by the religious ceremony 
and he could not continue his way. He started cursing the people around him loudly, tried to 
drive through the crowd and finally he got out of the car and threatened the persons next to 
him with an air rifle shouting that he would kill them if they did not get out of his way.
According to section 215 in the Criminal Code of Hungary, any person, who a) restricts 
another person in his freedom of conscience by applying violence or duress, b) prohibits 
another person from freely exercising his religion by applying violence or duress, is guilty 
of a felony punishable imprisonment for up to three years.
The Author does not agree with the judicial decision which convicted the defendant for 
committing the violation of the freedom of conscience and religion. If only the semantic 
content of the rule is analysed, this case could be easily qualified as violation of freedom of 
conscience and religion. It is true that the people participated in the procession were not 
able to continue the ceremony in peaceful circumstances. However, this decision would be 
wrong. Going beyond the text and revealing the values that this criminal norm protects, 
it becomes clear that this norm protects freedom of religion and conscience and the right to 
practice religion without interruption. It becomes obvious that any offender should have 
exactly the intention to force or threat someone because of their religious beliefs and 
restricting or preventing them from exercising their religion. Only in that case can the 
offender be convicted under this section. Since the offender’s behaviour was not intended to 
restrict or prevent the victims from exercising their religion – he just expressed his anger 
because he could not continue his way, This case represents a ‘simple’ public nuisance 
offence as the offender had ‘only disturbed’ the victims in participating in the ceremony.
However, the case mentioned at the beginning of this paper, is not public nuisance, or 
at least, the issue cannot be decided in a simple way. Here again, a more complex 
examination of the relevant values are (or should have been) of a great help for the judge. 
At first glance, the defendants’ conduct could be qualified as public nuisance – throwing 
paints on the residence of the president of Hungary surrounded by a crowd in itself can be 
anti-social and can incite indignation. However, the special circumstances of the case i.e., 
the intention of the defendants did not involve causing a great damage and their conduct 
was an expression of their opinion against the government’s actions during a legally 
organized demonstration should have urged the judge to make a complex analysis on the 
freedom of speech, its content and limits. However, the reasoning of the judge did not 
contain any arguments concerning these constitutional values and the values protected by 
the offence of public nuisance.59
58 Judicial Decision Nr. EBH 1999. 2. Bencze (2011) 97–98. 
59 Bócz (2017) 6. See the decision of the Central District Court of Buda 10.B.I.650/2017/3. 
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This paper aimed to throw light on the problematic elements in the requirement 
of certainty in criminal law. This demand is often analyzed by the Constitutional Court of 
Hungary which is authorized to annul statutes that do not meet the requirement of the clarity 
of norms doctrine. As far as can be seen, the HCC rarely annuls statutes for being unclear. 
In most of the cases, it argues that criminal norms should be articulated in a flexible and 
abstract manner then criminal law must be capable of adjusting to the constantly changing 
world and new cases as well. In general, the HCC accepts the view that clarity depends on 
judicial interpretation. When a criminal statute includes abstract and general concepts, 
judges are entitled to elucidate their legal content by interpretation. Notwithstanding, 
it seems that in judicial practice judges do not tend to face the moral dilemmas that are 
raised by the cases where legal uncertainty appears concerning the applicable rule. 
The requirement established by the HCC (making criminal laws’ content clear by judicial 
interpretation) only can be realized in judicial practice if a ‘Dworkinian’ conception of 
criminal law is supported. If it is accepted that criminal law is part of a system which is 
based on moral and political principles of a constitutional democracy. This conception 
expects judges to engage in a more flexible and open reasoning in criminal cases and not to 
be afraid of resorting to values and principles behind the rules. These considerations are not 
the expressions of breaking with legal certainty but rather they are providing another, more 
complex conception of it. However, it is hard to imagine that judicial reasoning will adopt 
this conception of criminal law within a short time.
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